



Ordinary Inventions and the Global Market

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Abstract

The increasing presence in the city of an ordinary, commonplace psychosis, which would present itself in discrete signs, eventually imperceptible in daily situations, has led us to an investigation that encompasses several levels.

The postulation of an ordinary psychosis stands in contrast to the clinical entity inherited from classical psychiatry, the psychosis of exuberant symptoms, which we have already tended to call "extraordinary". This postulation has led us to a rich investigation.

A first glance of this subject points out to the possibility of the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-father to present itself in minimal signs, imperceptible in the daily situations. This hypothesis leads us to another: for a psychosis to be invisible at this point, its stabilization must be as effective as any other, eliminating the idea of deficit whatsoever related to the difference between psychosis and neurosis. This is what only the theory of generalized foreclosure allows, by postulating that the Name-of-father is only a symptom, as an operator of stabilization among others.

We can add one more statement to this chain of solidary propositions. Generalized foreclosure empties the idea of an universal stable Other as the basis of social bond, because the social order will be defined by the composition of symptoms operating at each moment of the social bond.

The stable Other, that of neurosis, could be defined as that of an institutional Other, 'standing up' - based on the etymology of the term - from Latin *in statuere*. It is a hierarchical and pyramidal system of rules, a discourse, a way of establishing a bond between speakers, defining a way of life that can be approximate to what Lacan delimited as the master's discourse.

Who's the psychotic Other? With what partner he plays? Generalized foreclosure prevents us from starting from this previously structured institutional neurosis. The presence and enjoyment of the Other will thus be not this kind of symbolic order but rather an "abstraction," as J. A. Miller puts it, without body. This abstraction will have then to be incarnated, and that is exactly what paranoia does, defining at the same time a way of acting in relation to it. That is why Miller defines paranoia as "consubstantial to the social bond."

Schizophrenia and paranoia must be distinguished, however, as Miller had already done since the 1980s when he stated that schizophrenia is the "native state of the subject" - that of an Other that is not established, embodied. To give body to this Other is what constitutes paranoid delirium. As we can see the difference between them is a nonexistent Other or a too much existent Other.

How is the Other of Ordinary Psychosis? It is also not-all [*pastout*], not exactly one, not exactly one body, but the Other of an unlocalized joy. How then would he distinguish himself from that of schizophrenia?

It should be noted that ordinary psychosis is integrated into the social bond without, however, going through paranoia. His Other is not that of delusional paranoid consistency, but neither is it inconsistent like that of schizophrenia. Our hypothesis is: ordinary psychosis is the paradox of the constitution of a place, not paranoid, in the social bond in times of an inconsistent Other.

It might be clearer if we consider the Other of our days from what economists call *market*. The neoliberal foundation is what we call "free competition", distinct from a competition in the classical sense. It is not organized by results in terms of more efficiency or better work, but by success and performance in terms of consumption. It does not define who has competence, but who sells more.

Who determines successes and failures in this world? The consumer. His choice is taken as the natural regulator and the market quality assurance. But does the consumer really chooses something? He does not choose what is better or truly necessary. He chooses what is irresistible to him. Something inside, stronger than himself makes this choice for him, it is a choice of *jouissance*. It doesn't matter if our Nikes are made from slave labor, nothing matters at all.

The consumer take his part of *jouissance* when he buys his gadgets, he does not choose, at least not as a self. Hence it is a fallacy to say that free will is at the basis of neoliberal capitalism, for what is essential is not what happens in the level of the conscious ego, but in the drives field. Hence neoliberalism may not be not only opposed to democracy, but rather responsible for its destruction (if democracy is to be defined as the "one by one" of the conscious vote).

The market deals above all with *jouissance* more than with individual choices. The absurdity of capitalism in Brazil unveils this truth violently. We have too many people here that are considered nobody, we don't have enough people to support the illusion of a real choice. What choice does a favela mother have regarding the best school for her children or the best hospital to treat them? In a country such as ours, where conditions of inequality make possible the existence of "ones" and "no-ones" all moderation in the *jouissance* runs away (the same holds probably for the condition of immigrants in Europe). Neoliberal subjectivity, both in its entrepreneurial and consumer aspects, can develops itself in a frightening way where there are "no brakes" related to its actions.

Despite this incredible generalization of this *not-all* condition, despite this inconsistency Other, the social bond stand still. How to find a place for ourselves at the big global trade show and resist the pression towards the infinite series of objects of consumption, beyond religion and fundamentalisms (solutions of a massive, paranoid Other)? The psychotic subject, in all times seeks and sometimes is succeeded in forming a connection with the fragments of the Other that he disposes, that gives him a place in the social Other even in conditions of a not-all *jouissance*. He deals with a disembodied Other, for whom is absolutely necessary to invent a solution to constitute, from the material available, a connection, always an invention device.

It was not for nothing that Lacan pointed out his *sinthoma* form in Joyce's possible psychosis. It is that the madmen, in the midst of their suffering and their failure, are all the time inventing. The psychotic, with his work, still is an essential partner of the analyst, for remaining an impossible-partner, embodying the impossibility of universal inclusion, of a "connected all."

A whole way of approaching the Freudian experience seems to place the analytic act in the vicinity of which Freud defined with Goethe as "take what you inherited from your parents and make it yours". We had added with Lacan that this inheritance is not something substantial but made of emptiness. We always inherit a non-know-what that makes us descendants, and the most authentic subject, of full speech, in Heidegger's line, would be, in this context, the one who assumed as its foundation the impossible of speech, that of saying the truth about the truth. Identifying yourself with your *sinthome* or knowing how to do with it, our compasses of the last

teaching of Lacan, gain, from ordinary psychosis, a field of tests to do learn how to go further in our psychoanalysis when it seems impossible to count with the impossible as *lack*, but only from the *jouissance* and its excesses. Instead of working with negative entities such as "emptiness," "helplessness," and "lacking-to-be [*manque-à-être*]," it forces us to put things in terms of "disconnection" and "connection," of loving and working in each case - constituting a clinic of generalized *supléances*. This clinic develops itself in terms of ways of uses of inventions, catastrophes and solutions that can be engendered to make *jouissance*, and not its absence, the mortar of living or, to paraphrase Lacan, to celebrate the taciturn weddings between empty life and the indescribable *jouissance*.

Psicosis y contemporaneidad

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